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Abstract
Social tensions impede social cohesion and public goods provision, and can be
a driving force for more serious conicts such as civil wars. Surprisingly, the emer-
gence of social tensions has been studied only rarely in the literature. In the present
contribution a game-theoretic model highlights how reputation concerns and the
structure of group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions. In partic-
ular, the respective e¤ects of ethnic fractionalization, polarization and segregation
are analyzed. The di¤erences between ethnicity and class, and the role of social mo-
bility are also studied. The predictions of the model can account for recent empirical
evidence.
JEL Classication: C72, D74, Z13.
Keywords: Conict, Group Cleavages, Reputation, Ethnicity, Social Capital.
0Address: Department of Economics, University of Zurich, drohner@iew.uzh.ch.
Acknowledgments: I would like to thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Maitreesh Ghatak,
for very valuable comments that have substantially improved the manuscript. I am also grateful to Toke
Aidt, Samuel Bowles, Partha Dasgupta, Robert Evans, Michael Findley, Marcus Hagedorn, Masayuki
Kudamatsu, John Miller, Karl Ove Moene, Massimo Morelli, David Myatt, Scott Page, Michelle Ren-
dall, Maria Saez-Marti, Rajiv Sethi, Christopher Wallace, Jörgen Weibull, Diego Winkelried, Elizabeth
Wood and Fabrizio Zilibotti for their helpful comments. Useful discussions with conference and seminar
participants in Amsterdam, Santa Fe NM, Columbus OH, Chicago, London, Berlin, Oslo, New York,
Paris, Oxford, Essex, York, Cambridge, Zurich, Warwick and Bern, and nancial support from the Swiss
National Science Foundation (SNF grant no. 100014-122636) are gratefully acknowledged. An earlier
version of this paper has been circulated under the title "Information, Reputation and Ethnic Conict".
1
1 Introduction
In the absence of e¤ective contract enforcement, low-level disputes over business can es-
calate and often result in signicant social tensions1. As shown by Varshney (2001), such
social tensions are particularly likely to arise in areas that are ethnically heterogeneous,
and where most social interaction takes place within groups.
History tells us that social tensions in ethnically heterogeneous societies can have very
serious consequences. Not only do they threaten social cohesion and impede collective
goods provision (see e.g., Alesina et al., 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005), but they can
take the form of spontaneous riots or communal violence, and can even develop into
full-blown civil war (cf. for example Brubaker and Laitin, 1998; Horowitz, 2000, 2001).2
In this paper we build a model of social tensions. Our starting point is the economic
interaction between individual players, who match randomly and have to choose between
cooperation or defection. Each player lives for two periods, and discounts the future.
Players have imperfect information about the "type" of the other players, and the so-
lution concept is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. For some category of players (i.e.,
"strong" types) defection leads to high short-run gains, but with positive probability
results in a bad reputation in the following period, making it harder to nd a business
partner. If this reputation cost of foregone trade gains is large enough, strong types are
induced to cooperate and social tensions are low.
The likelihood that the match in the second period is informed about the past defec-
tion plays a crucial role for the reputation cost of defection. We derive this probability
endogenously, based on the number and sizes of the di¤erent ethnic groups in the society
and their frequency of interaction. It is assumed that players spend more than a pro-
portional share of their time with people from their own ethnic group. Hence, it is more
likely that the second-period match is informed if the victim of a rst-period defection
comes from the same ethnic group. Thus, it is more costly to defect on someone of
the same group, and we easily establish that on average there are more social tensions
(dened as number of defections divided by total matches) occurring between groups
than within groups.
This simple framework yields a rich set of novel comparative static results on the
impact of group structure on individual incentives for cooperation: First, we nd that it
is less costly to defect on a trade partner from another group in a more polarized society
(i.e., with two ethnic groups of similar size). Intuitively, since none of the group sizes
becomes very small, none of the conditional probabilities of being informed becomes very
high.
Ethnic segregation (i.e., the own-group bias in matching) has subtle implications.
Due to monitoring e¤ects, within-group social tensions decrease and between-group ten-
1Cf. Horowitz (2000), Boehm (1986) and Tambiah (1990) for accounts of how individual disputes can
lead to widespread social tensions.
2Horowitz (1973: 1) gives the following example: "In May and again in September 1966, mobs of
Northern Nigerians set about attacking Ibo residing in the North. These massive killings were important
steps on the road to a powerful Ibo secessionist movement in Eastern Nigeria and nearly three years of
civil war".
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sions increase in more segregated societies. The impact on the total number of defections,
however, is ambiguous. In societies with high incentives for defection a marginal increase
in segregation can reduce the total number of disputes.
Ethnic fractionalization (i.e., the total number of groups) reduces the incentives for
within-group defection (as groups become smaller, monitoring is better), but makes
defection more likely in between-group matches (if there are many other ethnic groups,
a bad reputation in one of them has only small costs).
Further, we study how the results di¤er when the dividing line in society is class rather
than ethnicity. Contrary to ethnicity, class is not "immutable", i.e., if the economy
features some social mobility people can change class. The probability of switching
groups moderates the incentives for between-group defections, and we predict fewer
social tensions between classes than between ethnic groups, and nd that the qualitative
e¤ects of increases in social mobility are similar to decreases in segregation.
This framework ts well many real world settings, as illustrated by some examples.
Bates (2010), partially based on Evans-Pritchard (1940), gives an account of the Nuer,
who are pastoral people in Southern Sudan. Most of their economic interactions are
about cattle, with the risk of theft and dishonest business ("defection") held in check
by concerns about bad reputation and future disadvantages. These incentives usually
are su¢ cient to prevent dishonest business within the tribe, but often are too weak to
guarantee cooperation in between-tribe interactions: "Insofar as the Nuer raided cattle,
they tended to raid the cattle of others; raids within the tribe were rare" (Bates, 2010:
28). Accordingly, social tensions are observed mostly between tribes, but rarely within.
Horowitz (2000) points out that there are fewer defections in individual interactions
among people from the same ethnic group: "Common ethnicity enhances the predictabil-
ity of (...) behavior and imposes a set of normative obligations on transactions" (2000:
81). He also provides several examples where business disputes between individuals
from di¤erent ethnic groups resulted in signicant social tensions, e.g., business dis-
putes between Sinhalese and Tamil merchants in Sri Lanka, between Assamese, Bengali
and Marwaris traders in the Indian state of Assam, between Ivorians and Mossi in Ivory
Coast, and between Chinese and Malay in Malaysia. Horowitz provides similar examples
for Uganda, Kenya, Philippines and di¤erent parts of India. Likewise, individual level
business disputes led to social tensions between the Pathan and Bihari ethnic groups,
fueling Pakistans Karachi riots in 1985 (Tambiah, 1990).
Surprisingly, the emergence of social tensions has received little attention in the
theoretical literature. The most closely related paper is by Lester (2005) and models the
incentives for forming groups, where the main trade-o¤ is between groups being able to
sustain cooperation, and the anonymous market o¤ering more lucrative trades. In his
framework all groups need to be the same size (since otherwise some agents would switch
groups) and the individual decisions in equilibrium, i.e., "trust" in group matches versus
"trade" in the anonymous market, do not depend on the number of groups and their
size. Hence, it is not possible in such a setting to study the impact of group structures
on individual defection and social tensions, which is the goal of our paper.
A classic nding in the conict literature states that there are two necessary condi-
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tions for the onset of civil war: 1) the existence of social tensions and grievances, 2) the
feasibility of collective action to transform tensions into ghting (e.g., Gurr, 1970, 1993;
Hegre et al., 2001). While the current paper focuses on the rst of the two conditions,
the emergence of social tensions, all other formal models of social conict focus on the
second, collective action and group-level contest. Esteban and Ray (2008a) show that
the right combination of time and resources invested into contest makes mobilization and
alliance formation easier for ethnic than for class conict. In other papers, Esteban and
Ray (1999, 2008b, 2009) relate indicators of polarization and fractionalization to con-
tests between groups. They nd that in a collective action framework the total resources
groups spend on conict can be approximated as a weighted average of three widely used
indices of inequality, fractionalization and polarization. Also Robinson (2001) models
conict on the group level and inquires under what conditions ethnic conict is more or
less salient and destructive than class conict. Caselli and Coleman II (2010) study in-
teraction between di¤erent groups, and nd that ethnicity enforces coalition membership
and thereby increases the expected payo¤s of conict.3
All these theoretical papers focus on aggregate rather than on individual players.
While in contrast to our setting they cannot account for high social tensions, low trust
and low public good provision in ethnically divided societies, they explore mechanisms
for how ethnic social tensions can translate through collective action and mobilization
into full-blown ethnic wars.
The present framework also builds on the literature on commitment, reputation
and contract enforcement in trade and business (see Greif et al., 1994; Tirole, 1996;
Dixit, 2003)4. Fearon and Laitin (1996) emphasize intra-group enforcement of group
memberscooperation with players from other ethnic groups. Anderson et al. (2009)
study the enforcement of roscas. In contrast to these papers we analyze the e¤ects of
group structure on individual cooperation.
Also the literature on "social capital" is relevant (cf. Putnam et al., 1993; Knack
and Keefer, 1997). It is still controversial what this term precisely means and what it
should include. In the pioneering work of Putnam et al. (1993) social capital was dened
very broadly and included all "features of social organization, such as trust, norms and
networks, that can improve the e¢ ciency of society by facilitating coordinated actions"
(1993: 167). Similarly broad is Colemans (1988: S98) classic functionalist denition of
social capital as "not a single entity but a variety of di¤erent entities, with two elements
in common: they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate
certain actions of actors". Both of these denitions, and most of the literature, stress
an essentially positive view of social capital.
Dasgupta (2005: S10) argues against catch-all denitions of "social capital", which
he denes "to mean interpersonal networks, nothing more". The key concept in his
thinking is "trust", which is crucial for economic transactions, but needs to be rationally
3Also Strulik (2008) links ethnic diversity and group-level contest.
4There are also literatures on image scores and cooperation (e.g., Nowak and Sigmund, 1998) and
on sustaining cooperation in PD games with repeated matching (e.g., Kandori, 1992). Both of these
literatures study homogeneous societies without group cleavages.
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justiable, i.e., the other player must have incentives to be trustworthy (Dasgupta, 1988,
1999). "Social capital" (i.e., "social networks") in some situations can lead to trust
because it can give incentives to honor contracts. However, in Dasguptas (2005) view,
social networks can have also a "dark side" and be exclusive, exploitative or ine¢ cient.
This way of thinking connects well with our model, where ethnic networks imply
that players match more than proportionally with other players of their own group.
This feature can induce "trust" (i.e., beliefs about reputation costs of the opponent that
sustain cooperation) in within-group interactions, but it reduces trust in players from
other groups. Hence, there is less social cooperation in ethnically divided societies (i.e.,
more "defections" in the model). Our predictions are in line with the empirical evidence:
A more fractionalized group structure has been shown to result in less civic participation
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Vigdor, 2004), less trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002)
and less public goods provided (Alesina et al., 1999; Luttmer, 2001; Miguel and Gugerty,
2005; Lind, 2007).
Also the literature on civil wars is related. Vanhanen (1999), Ellingsen (2000), Sam-
banis (2001), Hegre et al. (2001), Collier and Rohner (2008) and Collier et al. (2009)
nd that ethnic heterogeneity and fractionalization increase the risk of civil wars and
other forms of political violence.5
In contrast, Reynal-Querol (2002) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) conclude
that ethnic conict is not driven by fractionalization, but by polarization.
Further, some scholars argue that segregation increases the risk of ethnic conict
(Diez Medrano, 1994; Olzak et al., 1996), while others stress that segregation, taking
the form of "partition", could be a solution to ethnic conict (Horowitz, 2000)6.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a basic model
of cooperation and defection for a homogeneous society. In section 3, group structure
is introduced in the model, and the impact of polarization and segregation assessed.
The model is extended to n-groups in section 4 and the e¤ects of fractionalization are
studied. Section 5 extends the model to class conict and social mobility, and section 6
concludes.
2 Reputation and Social Tensions in a Homogeneous So-
ciety
This section builds a simple framework that shows how concerns about reputation are
linked to the emergence of social tension. We start with the case of a homogeneous
society, then introduce ethnic divisions in the following section.
In particular, we focus on explaining whether the economic interaction between play-
ers is characterized by "defection" or "cooperation"7. The concepts of "defection" and
"social tension" are linked in the following way.
5 In Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoe­ er (2004) ethnic fractionalization is not found to
increase the risk of civil war.
6Sambanis (2000) concludes that partition does not signicantly prevent conict.
7These concepts are dened more formally under assumption G.2 below.
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Denition 1 Social tension is dened as "number of matches with defection" divided
by "total number of matches".
The more players defect, the higher the level of social tensions.
2.1 Assumptions
Below are listed the main assumptions and features of the basic model.
G.1 - General setting: The game lasts for an innite number of periods. A large
number of players match in pairs of two in each period. Each player lives for two periods
and discounts the future. When a player dies after the second period, a new player is
born. Players being in their rst period match with other players being in their rst
period, and players in their second period match with other players in their second
period. This assumption simplies the analysis, but could be dropped without a¤ecting
the results. New pairs form randomly in each period (it is possible, although unlikely,
to match with the same opponent as in the rst period).
G.2 - Actions: First, players choose between entering into contact with the opponent
or staying out, o. If players enter, they select between cooperation, c, or defection, d.
Thus, a 2 fc; d; og.
G.3 - Types: There are "strong" types, s, and "weak" types, w. Thus, t 2 fs; wg. A
proportion p of players are assumed to be strong.
G.4 - Payo¤ function: The payo¤ received is labeled taa, where the superscript t
refers to the type, the left subscript refers to the players own action, while the right-
hand side subscript refers to the opponents action. For example, the payo¤ of a weak
player who cooperates and matches with an opponent who defects is labeled wcd.
For simplicity we will focus on a reduced form of prots from interaction8. It is
assumed that whenever at least one player stays out there is no interaction and both
players of a match receive an outside option payo¤ equal to zero. Formally, toa = 
t
ao =
0. The payo¤s of some player i of type t in a one shot game are summarized in Figure 1.
It is assumed that for weak players the payo¤ structure is such that cooperation
would be a dominant strategy in a one-shot game and that they are better o¤ staying
out whenever their opponent defects. Thus, wcc > 
w
dc, 
w
cd > 
w
dd, 
w
cc > 0 > 
w
cd.
For strong types the payo¤ structure is such that defection is the dominant strategy
in a one-shot game: sdc > 
s
cc, 
s
dd > 
s
cd. Further, it is assumed that strong types would
always have incentives to enter the game: saa > 0, 8aa 2 fcc; dc; cd; ddg.
G.5 - Information: Players have incomplete knowledge about the type of their op-
ponent in both periods, but they know the distribution of types, i.e., p is common
8Various forms of intuitive contest success functions would be consistent with the features included
under G.4. This is for example the case for a simple di¤erence-form contest success function: Vi =
( 1
2
+ (Fi    Fj))S   cFi   gFj , where i,j = players,  = parameter capturing the decisiveness of
ghting e¤ort (with 0    0:5),  = parameter indicating the ghting strength of player i (0    1),
F = level of ghting e¤ort (0  F  1),  = ghting strength of player j (0    1), S = economic
gains (surplus) from interaction, c = parameter related to the cost of player is ghting e¤ort, and g =
parameter measuring player is cost inicted by the ghting e¤ort of player j.
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Player j
c d o
c πtcc πtcd 0
d πtdc πtdd 0Pl
ay
er
 i
o 0 0 0
Figure 1: Matrix of player is payo¤s
knowledge. When a player defects on an opponent who cooperates, a proportion q of
the population get informed about the bad behavior (where 0 < q < 1). When both
players of a match defect or if no defection occurs, nobody gets informed. Formally, we
have a signal  2 f0; 1g, where informed players receive a signal  = 1, while uninformed
players receive  = 0.
G.6 - Beliefs: Players have rational beliefs and do Bayesian updating. They believe
that with probability  their current opponent is strong. In the rst period when there is
no a priori information about the type of the opponent players, beliefs simply correspond
to the prior,  = pp+(1 p)tw , where tw=proportion of weak players entering the game.
To make the analysis interesting, we assume that p <  (a formal derivation of the
threshold level  will follow further below), and that accordingly a weak type would
have incentives to enter the game in the rst period, whenever her fellow weak players
enter.
In what follows we will focus on the solution of the game when "uninformed" weak
players enter the game in the rst period, tw = 1, leading to  = p < . There always
exists another equilibrium in pure strategies, which is less relevant to our research ques-
tion, when all weak players stay out, decreasing thereby the expected value of entering
for fellow weak players.
Similarly, it is assumed that the probabilities are such that weak types also have
incentives to enter the game in the second period if they receive no signal, ( j  =
0) < . Like for the rst period, we focus on the equilibrium in which they do so,
not discussing in detail a situation when all weak players stay out (which, again, is less
relevant to our research question). The beliefs are derived in more detail further below.
G.7 - Solution concept: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in pure strategies.
2.2 Results
We shall solve this rst building block of the model through backward induction. The
behavior in the second period of the playerslives is as follows:
Lemma 1 In her second period of life a strong player will always defect.
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Proof. In the second period there is no shadow of the future and players behave as in
a one-shot game. Given sdc > 
s
cc, 
s
dd > 
s
cd, strong players will always defect, a=d.
A similar reasoning applies to weak players. The condition for which a weak player
would prefer a=c to a=o in her second period is as follows:
wcd + (1  )wcc > 0 (1)
After reformulation we obtain the threshold level  = 
w
cc
wcc wcd . Thus, if  < 
, a
weak player prefers a=c. Note that 0 <  < 1 always holds, given that wcc > 0 and
wcd < 0.
Lemma 2 In her second period of life a weak player will never defect. She will stay out,
whenever   , and will enter and cooperate for  < .
Proof. In the second period there is no shadow of the future and players behave as in
a one-shot game. Given wcc > 
w
dc, 
w
cd > 
w
dd, weak players will never have incentives to
defect. As shown above a weak player is better o¤ playing a=c rather than a=o if and
only if  < .9
Now we can analyze the actions chosen in the rst period of weak playerslives.
Lemma 3 In her rst period of life a weak player always enters and cooperates.
Proof. See Appendix.
To make the analysis interesting, we made the assumption G.6. This rules out situ-
ations where weak players always stay out in their second period and where accordingly
strong players never have incentives to cooperate. Before deriving the strong players
optimal action in period 1, we shall analyze in more detail the beliefs.
The beliefs are updated using Bayesrule. It follows from lemma 3 that weak players
never defect in their rst period. For observing  = 1 the beliefs are as shown below.
( j  = 1) = pzs(1  pzs)q
pzs(1  pzs)q = 1 (2)
where zs=proportion of strong types that defect in their rst period.
If zs=0, this expression is not dened and Bayes rule cannot be used. Only the
o¤-equilibrium beliefs ( j  = 1)   are consistent. For ( j  = 1) <  weak players
choose a=c, which gives incentives to strong types to always choose a=d. Accordingly,
the beliefs for this case should be ( j  = 1) = 1, making the beliefs ( j  = 1) < 
inconsistent. For observing  = 0, the beliefs are:
9For simplicity, we adopt the tie-breaking rule that weak players stay out if they are indi¤erent
between a=o and a=c.
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( j  = 0) = p(1  zs) + pzs(1  (1  pzs)q)
(1  p) + p(1  zs) + pzs(1  (1  pzs)q) (3)
Given that ( j  = 1) = 1, it follows directly from lemma 2 that whenever a weak
player observes  = 1 in her second period, she will stay out. In contrast, following
assumption G.6, ( j  = 0) <  and after observing  = 0 weak players will choose
a=c in the second period. This represents the reputation cost of defection in the rst
period for a strong player: After selecting a=d in her rst period, a given strong player
may have di¢ culties nding a business partner in her second period.
Now we shall derive the optimal action of strong players in their rst period.
E(sda) = zs
s
dd + (1  zs)sdc +  [psdd + (1  (1  zs)q)(1  p)sdc] (4)
E(sca) = zs
s
cd + (1  zs)scc +  [psdd + (1  p)sdc] (5)
where  = discount rate, E refers to expected value.
We know that in the rst period (when there are no signals), the beliefs simply
correspond to the prior, i.e.,  = p. After reformulation we obtain the condition for
which E(sda) > E(
s
ca):
zsp [
s
dd   scd] + (1  zsp) [sdc   scc] > q(1  zsp)(1  p)sdc (6)
Equation (6) above is intuitive. Defection is worthwhile if the short-run gains from
defection (left-hand side) are larger than the opportunity cost of foregone trade due to
a bad reputation in the second period (right-hand side). As a tie-breaking rule it is
assumed that players choose cooperation whenever they are indi¤erent. Equation (6)
can be expressed in terms of q:
q <
zsp [
s
dd   scd] + (1  zsp) [sdc   scc]
(1  zsp)(1  p)sdc
 q (7)
The variable q relates to the reputation cost of defection. If q < q, defection is
worthwhile. Please note that for q < q it must be that zs = 1. There can be multiple
equilibria.
Lemma 4 In her rst period of life a strong player always enters and cooperates if
q  q, while she enters and defects for q < q.
Proof. This follows from equation (7).
Combining the results of the lemmas 1 to 4 we obtain the solution of the game
described below in proposition 1.
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Proposition 1 The following strategies constitute the unique Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium for all "uninformed" weak players entering the game. The weak types play (a = c;
 = p) in the rst period. In the second period, weak players select (a = o;   ) for
 = 1, and (a = c;  = p(1 zs)+pzs(1 (1 pzs)q)(1 p)+p(1 zs)+pzs(1 (1 pzs)q)) for  = 0. In the rst period strong
types play (a = d;  = p) for q < q, and play (a = c;  = p) for q  q. In the second
period strong types select (a = d; with the same beliefs as the weak types).
Proof. Follows from the lemmas 1 to 4.
Intuitively, proposition 1 describes a setting in which "weak" players are only willing
to enter in a trade relationship if it is quite likely that their opponent will not cheat
on them. The probabilities and beliefs are constructed such that without any negative
information about their trade partner they are willing to take the risk and will agree to
trade. Thus, "strong" players face a trade-o¤ between being honest in the rst period
and beneting from a good reputation in the second period, or cheating in the rst
period. In this latter case they receive some immediate gain in the rst period, but have
with some probability a bad reputation in the second period, which makes it harder
to nd a trading partner. Whether cheating is worthwhile depends on how likely the
information about the bad behavior spreads. This is captured by the variable q. If this
"information likelihood" q of defection is high enough, social tensions are small.
Note that one interesting implication of this result is that following progress in tech-
nological possibilities of communication (which lead to a larger q), we should expect
social tensions to decline. This prediction of the model is consistent with the empirical
nding that industrialized countries are less likely to experience conict (cf. Fearon and
Laitin, 2003; Collier and Hoe­ er, 2004).
In a homogeneous society the variable q was just regarded as a constant. In ethnically
divided societies q becomes endogenous, as discussed in the following section.
3 Introducing Group Cleavages in the Model
In homogeneous societies the probability q that the match in the second period is in-
formed about the defection in the rst period simply corresponds to the number of players
getting informedm divided by the total number of players n in a society, q = m=n  k.10
Intuitively, we can think of the informed players as "friends". For example, if some player
has ten friends in a community of a hundred people, q would equal 0:1.
In ethnically divided societies the probabilities of the match in the second period
being informed about ones defection di¤ers depending on whom one defects on. We
make the following assumptions to include group structure.
G.8 - Two groups: Initially, we assume that the population is composed of two
groups, i and j, which di¤er in ethnic characteristics (in section 4 the model will be
10To be precise, q corresponds to the likelihood of "information dissemination" after defection on an
opponent who cooperates (cf. G.5). For simplicity we will in the remainder of the paper just refer to q
as information dissemination after defection (while meaning defection on a cooperating opponent).
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extended to n-groups). The rst group i amounts to a share w of the whole population
(0 < w < 1). Accordingly, the part v = (1  w) of the population belongs to group j.
G.9 - Intense intra-group interaction: Players spend more than the proportional part
of their time for interaction with their own ethnic group. In fact, there are two broad
categories of activities people engage in: First, activities where matching is independent
of group size, and, second, activities where people match with others proportional to
group size.
The rst category can be further divided into two sub-categories: cultural/religious
activities and ethnic business dominance/monopolies. In particular, people belong to
ethnic contact networks (cf. Horowitz, 2000; Rauch, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2010) and
spend some important share of their time for ethnic cultural events, religious ceremonies,
tribal gatherings etc.
Further, some economic activities are dominated by particular ethnic groups (cf.
Horowitz, 2000, for a survey of the abundant literature on this). According to Horowitz
(2000: 108), "the concentration of particular ethnic groups in particular sectors of the
economy and in particular occupations within sectors is a feature of many societies (...)".
Tambiah (1990) gives the example of the transport business in Karachi that is the ethnic
monopoly of the Pathans. Often past colonial policies11 or cultural and religious factors12
were the initial sources of this specialization, but even centuries after the initial sources
of distortion have been removed, substantial ethnic division of labor persists (Horowitz,
2000).
Crucially, during the time a player spends for cultural and religious events and eth-
nically dominated economic activities, she meets only players from these given ethnic
groups, independently of the relative group sizes (i.e., a player spends constant parts
of her time for these activities, even if the sizes of the involved ethnic groups change).
However, a player spends the remainder of her time for activities that are not ethnicity
specic, and for which she has intra- or inter-group interactions proportionally to the
relative group sizes.
Formally, people spend a xed part of time di on within-group interaction, i.e.,
for ethnicity-specic cultural and religious events and for economic activities that are
dominated by their own ethnic group. Similarly, people spend a smaller xed part of
time ei for between-group interaction, i.e., for economic activities that are dominated by
the other group. The rest of their time, (1   di   ei), is spent proportionally to group
sizes.
Clearly, di  ei. This reects the empirical evidence that intra-group interaction is
typically much more frequent than inter-group interaction (cf. for example Fearon and
11For example, "in Malaysia, Chinese were encouraged to enter to mine tin and to trade, Indians to
tab rubber, Ceylonese to run the railroads. In Trinidad, Guyana, Fiji, and Mauritius, Indians were
imported to cut sugar cane" (Horowitz, 2000: 109).
12For example, pilgrimages to Mecca favored the dominant Muslim position in trade in Medieval times
(Jha, 2008), and the Jewish dominance in Medieval lending was related to the fact that "the Churchs
ban on lending money at interest did not apply to Jews, who were considered to be outside the Christian
community" (Bottincini, 2000).
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Laitin, 1996; Horowitz, 2000; Varshney, 2001).13
The probabilities of meeting a player belonging to the same group i, P (S), resp. of
meeting a player belonging to the other group j, P (D), become:
P (S) = di + (1  di   ei)w (8)
P (D) = ei + (1  di   ei)(1  w) (9)
where w = population share of the players own group (0 < w < 1). The expressions
are analogous for group j.
Note that P (S) = 1  P (D). Given the evidence mentioned above we want to focus
on situations where indeed players spend more than a proportional share of their time for
within-group interaction, i.e., where P (S) > w. This is the case, as long as di > ei w1 w .
We assume that this always holds.
This greater intensity of contact is the channel through which ethnicity matters in the
present framework. If people were equally likely to match with people from any group,
ethnicity would not play a role. This contact intensity also distinguishes ethnicity from
other potential group characteristics such as, say, size, which are not salient in conicts.
Our model allows for di¤erent levels of d and e for di¤erent groups, and this general
case will also be emphasized for the analysis of intra-group interaction and for comparing
the likelihood of within- versus between-group tension. For the comparative statics on
inter-group interaction, however, we will make for expositional ease the non-critical
assumption that all groups have the same level of di = dj  d, resp. ei = ej  e.
G.10 - Matching: For some values of d, e and w, not all players are matched with
a trade partner. Without loss of generality we can assume the existence of some com-
pensation package that leaves non-matched and other players in the same situation as if
everybody had found a match.
3.1 The Likelihood of Intra-Group and Inter-Group Tension
First, we shall derive the probability of the second periods match being informed when
a given player defects on someone of her own group. This probability is labeled qS :
qS = P (S)P (m j S) + P (D)P (m j D) (10)
where, P (S)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to the same group, P (m j
S)=Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the same group,
P (D)=Probability of meeting a player belonging to another group, P (m j D)=Probability
of the match being informed, conditional on being from another group.
Given (8) and (9), the conditional probabilities become:
13As an illustration, in the 2001 German Socio-Economic Panel 62% of non-Germans (who were 15%
of the sample) indicated that their best friend was non-German, while only 4% of Germans had a
non-German as their best friend (Dustmann et al., 2010).
12
P (m j S) = (di + (1  di   ei)w)m
w  n =
di + (1  di   ei)w
w
k (11)
where k = m=n.
P (m j D) = (ei + (1  di   ei)(1  w))m
(1  w)n =
ei + (1  di   ei)(1  w)
(1  w) k (12)
Introducing (8), (9), (11) and (12) in (10), we obtain the overall probability of the
next match being informed after intra-group defection:
qS = k

d2i
w
+
e2i
1  w + 1  (di + ei)
2

(13)
For inter-group defection, the overall probability, qD, of the next match being in-
formed equals again the right-hand side of equation (10), and P (S) and P (D) are the
same as before (see (8), resp., (9)). The new conditional probabilities become:
P (m j S) = ej + (1  dj   ej)w
w
k (14)
P (m j D) = dj + (1  dj   ej)(1  w)
(1  w) k (15)
Introducing (8), (9), (14) and (15) into (10), we obtain (16), which is the overall
probability of the next match being informed after inter-group defection.
qD = k

diej
w
+
djei
1  w + 1  (di + ei)(dj + ej)

(16)
Note that we focus on relatively small levels of k, to make sure that all probabilities
are well-dened between 0 and 1.
The variables of qS and qD correspond to the likelihood of the next opponent being
informed in the case of within-group, resp. between-group defection. The reputational
costs of defection are monotonically increasing in this likelihood of "information dissem-
ination". The following numerical example illustrates the equations above.
Example 1 There is a population n of 100 people, and every player has 10 friends
(m = 10) whom she informs in case of defection. Thus, k = 0:1. Half of the population
are from group A, w = 0:5, the other half from group B. Players spend, say, 40% of
their time for strict within-group activities (d = 0:4), and 5% of their time for activities
that necessarily involve the other group (e = 0:05). The rest of their time they spend
according to population sizes. This implies that players end up spending 67:5% of their
time interacting with people from their own group (P (S) = 0:675) and 32:5% of their
time interacting with people from the other group (P (D) = 0:325). Thus, we obtain the
following probability qS that the future match of a player is informed after within-group
defection: qS = 0:112. In contrast, after between-group defection, qD = 0:088.
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As shown in the proposition below qS > qD holds for any parameter values.
Proposition 2 The "information dissemination" of intra-group defection, qS, is greater
than the information dissemination of inter-group defection, qD, while the information
dissemination of defection in homogeneous societies, k, is in-between qS and qD. Thus,
social tensions between groups are more likely to arise than tensions within groups or
tensions in homogeneous societies.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 tells us that it is costlier for "strong" players to cheat on someone from
their own group than on someone from the foreign group, due to the higher likelihood
of the future match being informed.
3.2 The Impact of Polarization
Here we focus on the case of polarization between two groups, which is dened in the
following way.
Denition 2 Polarization  1   jw   vj, where w = population share of group i, v =
population share of group j.
The more similar the population shares of the two groups, the higher is the level of
polarization in a given society. This is consistent with the commonly used denitions
and measures of polarization (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
The e¤ect of group size on information dissemination after within-group defection is
given by:
@qS
@w
= k
 d2i
w2
+
e2i
(1  w)2

= k

e2iw
2   d2i (1  w)2
w2(1  w)2

< 0 (17)
This derivative is negative, given our assumption G.9 above (di > ei w1 w , P (S) >
w), i.e., when people spend more than the proportional share of their time on intra-group
interaction. This implies that increases in the size w of a players own group i lead to
more within-group defection and a higher likelihood of intra-group tension for group i.
An increase in w corresponds however to a decrease in v (as v = 1   w), lowering the
likelihood of intra-group tension for the second group j.
As mentioned above, for simplicity we always set for the comparative statics of inter-
group interaction di = dj  d, ei = ej  e. The impact of changes in w on qD is given
by:
@qD
@w
= k
 de
w2
+
de
(1  w)2

= k

de(2w   1)
w2(1  w)2

(18)
The expression @qD=@w becomes positive for w > 0:5. We shall now analyze the
e¤ects of an increase in polarization.
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Proposition 3 A marginal increase in polarization (decreasing the population share of
the more numerous group and increasing the share of the less numerous group) results
in a reduced level of intra-group tension inside the more numerous group and in a higher
level of intra-group tension inside the smaller group.
Proof. In equation (17) we have @qS=@w < 0. Thus, increasing (resp., decreasing) w
results in a lower (resp., higher) qS , and therefore a higher (resp., lower) likelihood of
defection and social tension.
Intuitively, for the more numerous group, a decrease in its size increases the likelihood
that fellow group members will become informed and thus increases the reputation cost
of defection. The e¤ect goes in the opposite direction for an increase in the group size
of the less numerous group.
It is summarized below in proposition 4 how an increase in polarization a¤ects qD.
Proposition 4 A marginal increase in polarization results in a lower information dis-
semination of defection qD (for both groups) and accordingly in a higher level of inter-
group tension.
Proof. For w > 0:5 in equation (18) we have @qD=@w > 0, and for w < 0:5 we have
@qD=@w < 0. Thus, decreasing w of the more numerous group results in a lower qD (as
w > 0:5 ) @qD=@w > 0), whereas increasing v of the smaller group results in a lower
qD as well (as v < 0:5 ) @qD=@w < 0).
Intuitively, the information dissemination qD increases in the conditional probabilities
of being informed, captured by equations (14) and (15). If the groups become very
unequal in size, one of these two probabilities will sharply increase, given that the relative
group sizes are in the denominator of these terms. This results in a large qD. For high
levels of polarization, both terms remain moderate in size, and qD stays low.
Note that while all other propositions of the paper remain unchanged for the special
case of e = 0, in the two propositions 4 and 8 (as discussed further below), polarization,
resp. fractionalization only matter for inter-group defection when e > 0. More pre-
cisely, for polarization the e¤ect of w on qD becomes smaller as e decreases and nally
becomes zero for e = 0. This is intuitive: First, on a very general level, a reduced e
moves matching probabilities closer to proportionality. Clearly, the closer the matching
probabilities are to proportionality, the less ethnic group structure matters (as under full
proportionality information dissemination would be the same for defecting on any player
in the society). Second, and more specically, a decrease in e corresponds to a society
where di¤erent ethnic groups are less dependent on each other. As shown below, a drop
in e leads to more between-group social tensions. Hence, we can think of the e¤ects of
polarization and of a less inter-dependent society as being substitutes. One interesting
empirical implication of this is that the e¤ects of ethnic polarization (and fractionaliza-
tion) are predicted to be largest in countries with more ethnic business monopolies (e.g.,
in many former colonies, cf. Horowitz, 2000).
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Figure 2: The impact of polarization
Figure 2 plots as a numerical example14 the levels of qS and qD for di¤erent levels
of w. The values of qD are lower than the values of qS , indicating that the likelihood of
inter-group tension is higher than of intra-group tension. Further, the values of qS for
some group are decreasing in its size, reecting the lower reputation cost of defection
when monitoring is "harder". Variable qD takes its lowest value at w = 0:5 (maximum
polarization). Hence, the more polarized a society, the greater is the likelihood of inter-
group tension.
Our results on polarization increasing inter-group social tensions which are a nec-
essary condition for conict are consistent with Montalvo and Reynal-Querols (2005)
ndings that ethnic polarization increases the risk of civil war.
3.3 The Impact of Segregation
The concept of segregation refers to the separation and lack of interaction between
di¤erent groups. In our model we capture this by the net amount of time spent for
exclusive within-group activities. The following denition applies:15
14The following parameter values have been used: di = dj = 0:6, ei = ej = 0:15 and k = 0:3.
15There are alternative ways of formally dening segregation. Remember, given assumption G.9 we
have P (S) > w, i.e., people match more often than proportionally with other people from their group.
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Denition 3 Segregation  di   ei.
High values of di (and low values of ei) correspond to strong segregation, with only
little inter-group interaction. Low values of di (and relatively large values of ei) indicate
a very integrated society with a lot of inter-group interaction. In our comparative statics
we will focus on the impact of an increase in di (holding all other parameters constant).16
Remember that we had dened social tensions as the proportion of interactions that
were conicted, i.e., where defection occurred. This concept has so far been appropriate,
as until now di was constant. For the analysis of segregation, however, di is not constant.
Thus, we shall dene a further concept that not only captures the likelihood of defection
per interaction but also the number of interactions.
Denition 4 Social disputes  total number of defections.
Please note that "social disputes"  (total number of defections) = (social tensions)
 (number of interactions). Further, notice that an increase in di leads to more intra-
group and less inter-group matches, as @P (S)=@di > 0 and @P (D)=@di < 0.
We shall rst establish the impact of changes in di on the likelihood of intra-group
tension.
@qS
@di
= k

2di
w
  2(di + ei)

= 2k

di
1  w
w
  ei

> 0 (19)
The derivative @qS=@di is always positive, given our assumption of relatively more
intense intra-group interaction (di > ei w1 w , P (S) > w). Increases in di result in
increases in qS , and thus lead to a reduced scope for intra-group tension. However, the
impact of segregation on the total number of disputes is ambiguous. Although tensions
are reduced, intra-group interaction becomes more frequent, as @P (S)=@di > 0. The
proposition below summarizes this trade-o¤:
Proposition 5 More segregation (i.e., a higher di) increases qS and thereby results in
less intra-group tension. If the increase in qS is substantial, it can lead to initially
conicted interactions (qS < q) becoming peaceful (qS  q), thereby reducing total
intra-group disputes. In contrast, for smaller increases in qS, segregation can result in a
higher level of total intra-group disputes by making intra-group interaction more frequent.
Proof. Follows from equation (19) and the discussion above.
This result is intuitive, as more intra-group interaction increases the monitoring of
intra-group defection, reducing in this way social tensions. Now we shall analyze the
e¤ects of segregation on inter-group interactions.
One alternative denition of segregation that takes group sizes into account would be: Segregation 
P (S) w = di(1 w)  eiw. However, the results of the comparative statics would be the same for this
alternative denition, as the level of segregation would still be increasing in di, and decreasing in ei.
16Our conclusions about the impact of segregation would be the same if we focused on a decrease in
ei instead, as @qS=@ei < 0 and @qD=@e > 0.
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@qD
@d
= k

e

1
w
+
1
1  w

  2(d+ e)

< 0 (20)
We obtain a negative derivative if d e.17 Thus, given our assumption of relatively
intense within-group interaction (d  e), a rise in segregation leads, as players from
di¤erent groups meet less often, to a lower information dissemination of defection qD,
and to more inter-group social tensions. At the same time, more segregation reduces
inter-group interaction (as @P (D)=@d < 0), making the overall e¤ect on inter-group
disputes ambiguous.
Proposition 6 Segregation increases inter-group tensions. The impact on inter-group
disputes is ambiguous. Full segregation (d = 1, e = 0) eliminates inter-group disputes
entirely. For intermediate levels of segregation (0 < d < 1), and initially conicted
inter-group interactions (qD < q), segregation reduces the occurrence of inter-group
disputes by decreasing inter-group interaction (as already qD < q, a further decrease in
qD does not matter). For initially honest and peaceful inter-group interaction (qD  q),
segregation can increase the scope for inter-group disputes, if the decrease in qD is large
enough such that afterwards qD < q holds.
Proof. Follows from equation (20) and the reasoning discussed above.
This is in line with Varshneys (2001) and Jhas (2008) empirical ndings for India
that social tensions between ethnic groups are more likely to occur when social networks
are intra-ethnic and when between-group interaction is rare (i.e., d is large). In terms of
policy recommendations, the models predictions suggest that on the whole segregation
is harmful, unless one is initially in a situation where defection dominates (i.e., qD < q).
In such settings, like recently in Bosnia, keeping the ethnic groups separate can reduce
the total social disputes.
4 Social Tensions in an n-group Framework
For studying issues like polarization it made sense to limit ourselves to a 2-group frame-
work that allowed for an unequal size of the groups. However, for analyzing fractional-
ization, as well as for testing the robustness of previous results, it is helpful to have a
framework of n-groups of equal size each. Fractionalization is dened in the following
way:
Denition 5 Fractionalization  1  1r , where r = number of groups.
Clearly, the level of fractionalization increases in the number of groups in the society.
For intra-group defection in an n-group setting, the likelihood qS of the next periods
17The exact condition is 2d > e w
1 w + e
1 w
w
. This is similar to assumption G.9 and we shall assume
that this always holds.
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opponent being informed is given by equation (21), which corresponds to qS in the
2-group framework with w = 1=r, where r is the number of groups.
qS = k

d2i
(1=r)
+
e2i
1  (1=r) + 1  (di + ei)
2

(21)
As far as inter-group interaction is concerned, the main di¤erence between the n-
group and the 2-group framework is that in the n-group case strangers from other groups
do not all belong to the same other group. Thus, if a player from a group i defects on
an opponent of a given group j, this will result in a relatively high probability that other
players of group j are informed of the defection. However, players from another "foreign"
group l will be as badly informed about the defection as the players of the "home" group
i. Thus, it is necessary to take into account the probability of matching people from all
di¤erent groups as well as their conditional probability of being informed. This is done in
the Appendix. The likelihood of next periods match being informed about inter-group
defection is given by equation (22).
qD = k

2der
r   1 +
e2(r   2)r
(r   1)2 + 1  (d+ e)
2

(22)
Propositions 5 and 6, treating the e¤ects of segregation on social tensions and dis-
putes, also hold in a n-group framework if @qS=@di > 0, @qD=@d < 0. As qS is the same
in the n-group as in the 2-group framework (with w = 1=r), the results on intra-group
defection of the 2-group setting remain valid for n-groups. For inter-group defection,
@qD=@d is displayed in equation (23).
@qD
@d
= 2k

e
r   1   d

< 0 (23)
We obtain @qD=@d < 0 for d > e and at least two groups, i.e., r  2. Thus,
the conclusions of proposition 6 in the previous section hold as well for the n-player
framework (given the usual assumption G.9).
For assessing the impact of fractionalization on social tensions, we can focus on
@qS=@r and @qD=@r. For @qS=@r, we can simply refer to the discussion of @qS=@w in
the previous section. As w = 1=r, @qS=@r has just the opposite sign of @qS=@w before.
Thus, @qS=@r > 0. This leads to proposition 7.
Proposition 7 A marginal increase in fractionalization (i.e. increasing the number of
groups, r, in the population) results in a higher level of qS, and accordingly in a lower
level of intra-group tensions.
Proof. See proof of proposition 3.
Intuitively, as groups become smaller, intra-group monitoring increases. For assessing
the impact of fractionalization on inter-group tensions, we can focus on @qD=@r.
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@qD
@r
= 2ek

e  d(r   1)
(r   1)3

< 0 (24)
The derivative @qD=@r becomes negative for d > e and at least two groups, i.e.,
r  2, which leads to proposition 8.
Proposition 8 Fractionalization decreases qD and leads to more inter-group tensions.
Proof. Follows from equation (24).
This nding is intuitive, as the reduced relative size of the opponents group in a
fractionalized society makes it less likely to meet someone of that group in the future,
decreasing thereby the reputation cost of defection.
As for polarization, the size of the e¤ect of fractionalization on inter-group social
tensions is increasing in e, and becomes zero for the special case of e = 0. The intuition
is similar, i.e., moves towards more proportional matching reduce the e¤ects of group
structure, and lack of group inter-dependence (low e) and fractionalization behave as
substitutes.
This proposition is consistent with recent empirical evidence on ethnic fractional-
ization increasing social tensions, and thereby decreasing trust (e.g., Alesina and La
Ferrara, 2002), participation in social activities (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) and
public goods provision (e.g., Lind, 2007) and fueling conicts between ethnic groups
(e.g., Collier and Rohner, 2008).
5 Class Cleavages and Social Tensions
In this subsection we study whether and how our mechanism can apply also to class
conict. As expressed by Robinson (2001: 87), one key di¤erence between ethnic and
class divisions is that "while ethnic identity is immutable (or ascriptive), class is not,
since there is social mobility between capitalists and workers".18 In this subsection we
focus on this di¤erence and study the e¤ects of mobility between groups.
Traditionally, much of the literature in political science regarded class divisions and
vertical inequality as prime drivers of conict (e.g., Gurr, 1970, focusing on relative
deprivation). However, the econometric evidence in general has not supported these
arguments (Cramer, 2003). As put by Besançon (2005: 393-4), "Political scientists, for
decades, have argued that there is a nexus between economic inequality and political
violence, yet these decades of studies have empirically challenged this view. Rarely have
statistical studies resulted in a robust relationship between the two variables, and the
results have often been contradictory and inconclusive".
Indeed, in the large cross-country panel studies, economic inequality either has been
found to have no signicant impact on social conict (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Collier
18 In some cases ethnic identity is not completely immutable (cf. Posner, 2005, for Zambia), but
switching from one ethnic group to another is in general very di¢ cult (Horowitz, 2000).
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and Hoe­ er, 2004), or its e¤ect has been of indeterminate sign and not robust (Auvinen
and Nafziger, 1999; Besançon, 2005). Of course, these results do not necessarily imply
that there is no global link between inequality and social conict, as these results could
be due partly to the poor quality of inequality data (Cramer, 2003).
In contrast, the results are somewhat more a¢ rmative for micro-econometric studies.
While vertical inequality is still an insignicant predictor of social conict in some studies
(e.g., Ostby, 2008), there are quite a few papers where vertical inequality is signicant in
at least some (but usually not in all) of the specications: Deininger, 2003, for Uganda;
Justino, 2005, for India; Ostby et al., 2009, for 22 Sub-Saharan African countries; and
Hidalgo et al., 2010, for Brazil.
Thus it seems fair to summarize the empirical ndings of the literature on class
conict in the following two points: 1) In some contexts class divisions lead to social
conict, while in others not. 2) Economic inequality seems on average a less salient,
resp. powerful predictor of social conict than ethnic cleavages (Brubaker and Laitin,
1998; Horowitz, 2000; Esteban and Ray, 2008a).19
By making slight changes to the basic framework we can study class-related social
tensions and generate predictions that can be compared to these empirical ndings.
Take now a society that is ethnically homogeneous, but where there are two classes, the
workers and the bourgeoisie. As before, people tend to spend more than proportional
amounts of time with people from their own class. This may be due to the use of status
symbols or to di¤erences in disposable income, which for example could account for the
bourgeois residing in other areas and eating in other restaurants than workers do.
It would also be easy to include micro foundations in the model for inequality and so-
cial mobility. The source of persistent inequality could be capital-market imperfections
and investment indivisibilities (Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira, 1993,
Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). In such settings typically it can be obtained that class and
inequality persist: (dynasties of) workers remain workers and entrepreneurs remain en-
trepreneurs. If this was the end of the story, the framework of the previous sections
would apply, with just the group names relabeled.
However, as far as class is concerned, with random stochastic shocks people can
become socially mobile and move from one group to the other (Ghatak and Jiang,
2002). Given that our focus lies on explaining social tensions, we abstract from such
micro foundations and simply assume that for class divisions with some probability '
a given player changes her group (i.e., a poor person becomes rich, resp. a rich person
becomes poor).20 Thus, the parameter ' captures the level of social mobility.
For ethnic divisions, this switching probability ' was simply ' = 0. We could have
assumed ' to be positive for ethnic divisions as well, but it seems reasonable to think
that for ethnic divisions ' would be very small (Horowitz, 2000), and in any case smaller
than for class divisions. It is easier to change income level than, for example, it is to
19Note that the empirical evidence on the relative salience of class versus ethnicity is still somewhat
scarce. It would be useful to have more micro studies that horse-race identication strategies for in-
equality and ethnicity.
20For simplicity, we assume that players (potentially) switch groups right after their rst period inter-
action and before information dissemination. The results are robust to alternative timing assumptions.
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change skin color.
As before for the comparative statics of inter-group interaction, we assume for sim-
plicity di = dj  d, ei = ej  e. Further, we make the simplifying assumption that the
social mobility is similar in both directions (i.e., ' is the same for both groups). We also
assume that social mobility is not extreme and that players are more likely to stay in
their group than to switch groups, i.e., ' < 1=2.
Now the probabilities of meeting a player belonging to the same group i, P (S), resp.
of meeting a player belonging to the other group, P (D), become:
P (S) = (1  ')(d+ (1  d  e)w) + '(e+ (1  d  e)w) (25)
P (D) = (1  ')(e+ (1  d  e)(1  w)) + '(d+ (1  d  e)(1  w)) (26)
where '=probability of changing groups.
After reformulation, we can express ed  (1  ')d+ 'e and e (1  ')e+ 'd. Note
also that ed+ e= d+ e. Hence we can re-write P (S) and P (D) as:
P (S) = ed+ (1  ed  e)w (27)
P (D) = e+ (1  ed  e)(1  w) (28)
Note that P (S) = 1  P (D). Let us focus as before on situations where players are
always more than proportionally likely to match with someone from their home group,
i.e., where P (S) > w. This always holds as long as d > e w '1 w ' .
Note that P (m j S), P (m j D), qS , and qD are computed analogously as before,
simply using now ed and e, instead of d and e. Hence, comparing the e¤ects of class
divisions with those of ethnic divisions becomes straightforward.21
Proposition 9 The likelihood of social tensions between groups, resp. classes is ceteris
paribus higher in equal, but ethnically divided societies than in unequal, but ethnically
homogeneous societies. If a society has only a moderate conict potential (i.e., when q
is not too large) this conclusion also holds for the total number of disputes.
Proof. As ' > 0 and d > e, we have that ed < d (and e > e, which has the same
e¤ects). Further, from equation (20) we know that @qD=@d < 0. Hence in class-divided
societies qD is larger and the likelihood of social tensions between groups smaller. As
@P (D)=@d < 0, ed < d implies a larger inter-group matching intensity in class-divided
21 In this section we focus on the role of social mobility. Note that we could include another channel
that would make class tensions less likely: If there was some complementarity in production or in
trade between bourgeois and workers, this could imply that they match more often than people from
di¤erent ethnic groups do. Hence, d would be relatively smaller and e larger for unequal, but ethnically
homogenous societies, which would increase qD and hence decrease the likelihood of social tensions
between classes.
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societies, which potentially could increase the number of disputes, as in the analysis of
segregation. However, this will not be the case as long as q is small.
Our framework also allows us to generate predictions on the impact of social mobility.
Proposition 10 Increasing social mobility has qualitatively analogous e¤ects to decreas-
ing segregation (which are described in detail in propositions 5 and 6). In particular,
more social mobility leads to more social tensions within classes and less social tensions
between classes.
Proof. We have @ ed=@' < 0 (and @e=@' > 0), the e¤ects of which are analyzed in the
proofs of propositions 5 and 6.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined how group cleavages matter for the emergence of social tensions.
It has shown how the reputation cost of future opponents being informed about defection
can enforce cooperation. This reputation cost depends critically on the group structure,
and the relatively intense within-group matching explains why between-group tensions
are more frequent than within-group social tensions are.
Increases in polarization have been found to increase intra-group tensions in the
less numerous group, and decrease tensions inside the more numerous group. Increased
polarization also leads to more social tensions between groups.
The impact of increased segregation is less clear-cut, as segregation a¤ects not only
the level of social tensions, but also the frequency of interaction. If the e¤ect of segre-
gation on qS is large, it can reduce intra-group disputes, whereas otherwise it can result
in a rise of intra-group disputes. Inter-group disputes may be increased by segregation
if initially relations are peaceful, while segregation can reduce inter-group disputes if
initially interactions are conicted.
Fractionalization has been found to decrease social tensions within groups and in-
crease social tensions between groups.
We have also extended the model to study class rather than ethnic cleavages, and
found that social mobility makes social tensions between classes less likely than between
ethnic groups.
The ndings here can account for recent empirical evidence on the e¤ects of ethnic
polarization, fractionalization and segregation on trust, civic participation, public good
provision and on ethnic conicts. Further empirical research on group identity and social
tensions is encouraged.
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Appendix: Proofs and Derivations
Proof of lemma 3:
It follows from assumption G.6 that without any a priori knowledge of the opponent
the beliefs are such that  = p < . We know that weak players would always prefer
a=c to a=o as equation (1) always holds for  = p < . Assumption G.4 implies that
in a one-shot game, wcc > 
w
dc, 
w
cd > 
w
dd. Hence, in a one-shot game a=c would be the
best reply.
The only thing that could prevent a weak player from playing a=c is the "shadow
of the future", i.e., if a=o or a=d were to result in a more favorable reputation in the
second period. Clearly, as shown in lemma 1 strong players always defect in period 2
independently of their beliefs. Also, both actions a=c and a=o lead to a signal  = 0
for the future opponent in period 2 of life.
We shall prove by contraction that a=d cannot be preferred to a=c. Imagine that
a=d were to be preferred to a=c in the rst period. This can only be the case if a=d
lowers the opponents  in period 2 of life. Given that a=c leads to a signal  = 0,
a=d can only possibly be preferable if it results in a signal  = 1. This can only be
the case if a given weak player defects on an opponent who cooperates. However, given
that all weak players are identical, if one weak player were to have incentives to play
a=d, all others would play a=d as well. If both matching players defect, the resulting
signal is  = 0. Thus, a signal  = 1 is only consistent with a weak player choosing a=d
and matching with a strong type playing a=c. However, if all weak players choose a=d,
the best reply for strong players would be a=d rather than a=c (playing a=d in such a
context would lead to a higher payo¤ for the strong player and not alter her reputation
for period 2). 
Proof of proposition 2:
The probability P (S)i can be expressed as P (S)i = di+(1 di ei)w  Di, implying
P (D)i = 1 Di. Analogously, P (S)j = dj+(1 dj ej)(1 w)  Dj and P (D)j = 1 Dj .
Given our assumptions above, we know that Di > w and Dj > 1  w.
After reformulation, equation (10) yields for group i qS = k
h
D2i
w +
(1 Di)2
(1 w)
i
and
qD = k
h
Di
(1 Dj)
w + (1 Di)
Dj
(1 w)
i
(all results are identical for group j).
Equation (7) implies that a higher probability of the next match being informed, q,
reduces the incentives for defection. It follows that intra-group tensions are lower than
inter-group tensions if qS > qD. This is the case if condition (A.1) holds.
qS > qD , D
2
i
w
+
(1 Di)2
(1  w) > Di
(1 Dj)
w
+ (1 Di) Dj
(1  w) (A.1)
After reformulation this condition becomes Di(Di+Dj 1) > w(Di+Dj 1), which
always holds as long as Di > w and Dj > 1  w.
Intra-group tensions are lower than social tensions in homogeneous societies if qS > q.
We have q = k and qS = k
h
D2i
w +
(1 Di)2
(1 w)
i
: Setting k
h
D2i
w +
(1 Di)2
(1 w)
i
> k, we obtain
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after reformulation condition (A.2), which always holds for Di 6= w (this is the case for
Di > w).
qS > q , (Di   w)2 > 0 (A.2)
Inter-group tensions are greater than tensions in a homogeneous society if:
qD < q , Di (1 Dj)
w
+ (1 Di) Dj
(1  w) < 1 (A.3)
This condition holds if (Dj + w   1)(Di   w) > 0, which is the case for Di > w and
Dj > 1  w. 
Computing qD for n-groups:
For inter-group defection, the overall probability, qD, of the next match being in-
formed is given by equation (A.4).
qD = P (S)P (m j S) + P (C)P (m j C) + P (T )P (m j T ) (A.4)
where, P (S) = Probability of meeting a player belonging to the same group, P (m j S)
= Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the same group,
P (C) = Probability of meeting a player belonging to the group of the present opponent,
P (m j C) = Probability of the match being informed, conditional on being from the
group of the present opponent, P (T ) = Probability of meeting a player belonging to
some third group, P (m j T ) = Probability of the match being informed, conditional on
being from some third group.
As before, the likelihood of matching with a player of ones own group equals
P (S) = d+ (1  d  e)1
r
(A.5)
where r = number of groups. For simplicity we focus in the treatment of n-groups
on the same d and e for all groups.
The probability of matching in a given period with someone of the group of last
periods betrayed opponent (C) or some third group (T) equals, respectively:
P (C) =
e
r   1 + (1  d  e)
1
r
(A.6)
P (T ) = e

r   2
r   1

+ (1  d  e)r   2
r
(A.7)
The conditional probabilities are as follows:
P (m j S) = P (m j T ) =
e
r 1 + (1  d  e)1r
1
r
k (A.8)
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P (m j C) = d+ (1  d  e)
1
r
1
r
k (A.9)
Introducing equations (A.5) to (A.9) in (A.4), we obtain:
qD = k

2der
r   1 +
e2(r   2)r
(r   1)2 + 1  (d+ e)
2

(A.10)
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